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Abstract
We combine conditional variational autoencoders (VAE) with adversarial cen-
soring in order to learn invariant representations that are disentangled from nui-
sance/sensitive variations. In this method, an adversarial network attempts to
recover the nuisance variable from the representation, which the VAE is trained
to prevent. Conditioning the decoder on the nuisance variable enables clean sep-
aration of the representation, since they are recombined for model learning and
data reconstruction. We show this natural approach is theoretically well-founded
with information-theoretic arguments. Experiments demonstrate that this method
achieves invariance while preserving model learning performance, and results in
visually improved performance for style transfer and generative sampling tasks.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of learning data representations that are invariant to nuisance variations
and/or sensitive features. Such representations could be useful for fair/robust classification [21, 12,
20], domain adaptation [19, 16], privacy preservation [6, 7], and style transfer [14]. We investigate
how this problem can be addressed by extensions of the variational autoencoder (VAE) model
introduced by [9], where a generative model is learned as a pair of neural networks: an encoder
that produces a representation z from data x, and a decoder that reconstructs the data x from the
representation z.
A conditional VAE [17] can be trained while conditioned on the nuisance/sensitive variable s (i.e., the
encoder and decoder each have s as an additional input). In principle, this should yield an encoder that
extracts representations z that are invariant to s, since the corresponding generative model (decoder)
implicitly enforces independence between s and z. Intuitively, an efficient encoder should learn to
exclude information about s from z, since s is already provided directly to the decoder. However, as
we demonstrate in our experiments, invariance is not sufficiently achieved in practice, possibly due to
approximations arising from imperfect optimization and parametric models. The adversarial feature
learning approach of [4] proposes training an unconditioned autoencoder along with an adversarial
network that attempts to recover a binary sensitive variable s from the representation z. However,
this approach results in a challenging tradeoff between enforcing invariance and preserving enough
information in the representation to allow decoder reconstruction and generative model learning.
Our work proposes and investigates the natural combination of adversarial censoring with a condi-
tional VAE, while also generalizing to allow categorical (non-binary) or continuous s. Although an
adversary is used to enforce invariance between z and s, the decoder is given both s and z as inputs
enabling data reconstruction and model learning. This approach disentangles the representation z
from the nuisance variations s, while still preserving enough information in z to recover the data
x when recombined with s. In Section 2.2, we present a theoretical interpretation for adversarial
censoring as reinforcement of the representation invariance that is already implied by the generative
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Figure 1: Training setup for adversarially censored VAE. The encoder and decoder are trained to
maximize the sum of the objective terms (in three dotted boxes), while the adversary is trained to
minimize its objective.
model of a conditional VAE. Our experiments in Section 3 quantitatively and qualitatively show
that adversarial censoring of a conditional VAE can achieve representation invariance while limiting
degradation of model learning performance. Further, the performance in style transfer and generative
sampling tasks appear visually improved by adversarial censoring (see Figures 3 and 4).
1.1 Further Discussion of Related Work
The variational fair autoencoder of [11] extends the conditional VAE by introducing an invariance-
enforcing penalty term based on maximum mean discrepancy (MMD). However, this approach is not
readily extensible to non-binary or continuous s.
Generative adversarial networks (GAN) and the broader concept of adversarial training were intro-
duced by [5]. The work of [14] also combines adversarial training with VAEs to disentangle nuisance
variations s from the representation z. However, their approach instead attaches the adversary to
the output of the decoder, which requires a more complicated training procedure handling sample
triplets and swapping representations, but also incorporates the learned similarity concept of [10].
Our approach is much simpler to train since the adversary is attached to the encoder directly enforcing
representation invariance.
Addressing the problem of learning fair representations [21], further work on adversarial feature
learning [12, 20, 6, 7, 19, 16] have used adversarial training to learn invariant representations
tailored to classification tasks (i.e., in comparison to our work, they replace the decoder with a
classifier). However, note that in [12], the adversary is instead attached to the output of the classifier.
Besides fairness/robustness, domain adaptation [19, 16] and privacy [6, 7] are also addressed. By
considering invariance in the context of a VAE, our approach instead aims to produce general purpose
representations and does not require additional class labels.
GANs have also been combined with VAEs in many other ways, although not with the aim of
producing invariant representations. However, the following concepts could be combined in parallel
with adversarial censoring. As mentioned earlier, in [10], an adversary attached to the decoder learns
a similarity metric to enhance VAE training. In [13, 15], an adversary is used to approximate the
Kullback–Leibler (KL)-divergence in the VAE training objective, allowing for more general encoder
architectures and latent representation priors. Both [2] and [3] independently propose a method to
train an autoencoder using an adversary that tries to distinguish between pairs of data samples and
extracted representations versus synthetic samples and the latent representations from which they
were generated.
2 Formulation
In Section 2.1, we review the formulation of conditional VAEs as developed by [9, 17]. Sections 2.2
and 2.3 propose techniques to enforce invariant representations via adversarial censoring and increas-
ing the KL-divergence regularization.
2.1 Conditional Variational Autoencoders
The generative model for the data x involves an observed variable s and a latent variable z. The
nuisance (or sensitive) variations are modeled by s, while z captures other remaining information.
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Since the aim is to extract a latent representation z that is free of the nuisance variations in s,
these variables are modeled by the joint distribution (z, s,x) ∼ p(s)p(z)pθ(x|z, s), where z and s
are explicitly made independent. The generative model pθ(x|z, s) is from a parametric family of
distributions that is appropriate for the data. The latent prior p(z) can be chosen to have a convenient
form, such as the standard multivariate normal distribution N (0, I). No knowledge or assumptions
about the nuisance variable prior p(s) are needed since it is not directly used in the learning procedure.
The method for learning this model involves maximizing the log-likelihood for a set of training
samples
{
(xi, si)
}n
i=1
with respect to the conditional distribution
pθ(x|s) =
∫
pθ(x|z, s)p(z)dz.
This objective is analogous to minimizing the KL-divergence between the true conditional distribution
p(x|s) of the data and the model pθ(x|s) since
argmin
θ
KL
(
p(x|s)∥∥pθ(x|s)) = argmax
θ
E
[
log pθ(x|s)
]
,
where the expectation is with respect to (x, s) ∼ p(x|s)p(s) and can be approximated by
1
n
∑n
i=1 log pθ(xi|si).
Using a variational posterior qφ(z|x, s) to approximate the actual posterior pθ(z|x, s) =
p(z)pθ(x|z, s)/pθ(x|s), the log-likelihood can be lower bounded by
1
n
n∑
i=1
log pθ(xi|si) ≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
E
[
log pθ(xi|si, zi)
]−KL(qφ(z|xi, si)∥∥p(z))] =: Ln(θ, φ), (1)
where zi ∼ qφ(z|xi, si) in each expectation. The quantity Ln(θ, φ) given by (1) is known as the
variational or evidence lower bound (ELBO). The inequality in (1) follows since
1
n
n∑
i=1
log pθ(xi|si)− Ln(θ, φ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
KL
(
qφ(z|xi, si)
∥∥pθ(z|xi, si)) ≥ 0.
Thus, by optimizing both pθ(x|z, s) and qφ(z|x, s) to maximize the lower bound Ln(θ, φ), while
pθ(x|s) is trained toward the true conditional distribution p(x|s) of the data, qφ(z|x, s) is trained
toward the corresponding posterior pθ(z|x, s).
In the VAE architecture, the generative model (decoder) pθ(x|z, s) and variational posterior (encoder)
qφ(z|x, s) are realized as neural networks that take as input (z, s) and (x, s), respectively, as illustrated
in Figure 1, and output the parameters of their respective distributions. This architecture is specifically
a conditional VAE, since the encoding and decoding are conditioned on the nuisance variable s.
When the encoder is realized as conditionally Gaussian:
qφ(z|x, s) = N (z;µφ(x, s),Σφ(x, s)), (2)
where the mean vector µ and diagonal covariance matrix Σ are determined as a function of (x, s),
and the latent variable distribution is set to the standard Gaussian p(z) = N (0, I), the KL-divergence
term in (1) can be analytically derived and differentiated [9]. However, the expectations in (1) must
be estimated by sampling.
Hence, the learning procedure maximizes a sampled approximation of the ELBO Ln(θ, φ), given by
max
θ,φ
1
n
n∑
i=1
Li(θ, φ) (3)
≈ max
θ,φ
Ln(θ, φ) / max
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
log pθ(xi|si),
where, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Li(θ, φ) := −KL
(
qφ(z|xi, si)
∥∥p(z))+ 1
k
k∑
j=1
log pθ(xi|si, zi,j), (4)
which approximates the expectations in (1) by sampling {zi,j}kj=1 iid∼ qφ(z|xi, si).
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2.2 Representation Invariance via Adversarial Censoring
In principle, optimal training with ideal parametric approximations should result in an encoder
qφ(z|x, s) that accurately approximates the true posterior pθ(z|x, s), for which z and s are indepen-
dent by construction. Thus, the theoretically optimal encoder should produce a representation z that
is independent of the nuisance variable s. In practice, however, since the encoder is realized as a
parametric approximation and globally optimal convergence cannot be guaranteed, we often observe
that the representation z produced by the trained encoder is significantly correlated with the nuisance
variable s. Further, one may wish to train an encoder qφ(z|x) that does not use s as an input, to allow
the representation z to be generated from the data x alone. However, this additional restriction on the
encoder may increase the challenge of extracting invariant representations.
Invariance could be be enforced by minimizing the mutual information I(s; z) where z ∼ qφ(z|x, s)
is the latent representation generated by the encoder. Mutual information can be subtracted from the
lower bound of (1), yielding
1
n
n∑
i=1
log pθ(xi|si) ≥ Ln(θ, φ)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(si; zi),
where equality is still met for qφ(z|x, s) = pθ(z|x, s). Thus, incorporating a mutual information
penalty term into the lower bound does not, in principle, change the theoretical maximum. However,
since computing mutual information is generally intractable, we apply the approximation technique
of [1], which utilizes a variational posterior qψ(s|z) and the lower bound
I(s; z) ≥ h(s) + E[ log qψ(s|z)], (5)
where equality is met for qψ(s|z) equal to the actual posterior p(s|z) for which the expectation
and entropies are defined with respect to. Hence, maximizing E
[
log qψ(s|z)
]
over the variational
posterior qψ(s|z), which can also be similarly realized as a neural network, yields an approximation
of I(s; z)−h(s) = −h(s|z). The entropy h(s), although generally unknown, is constant with respect
to the optimization variables. Incorporating this variational approximation of the mutual information
penalty into (3), modulo dropping the constant h(s), results in the adversarial training objective
max
θ,φ
min
ψ
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
Li(θ, φ)− λ
k
k∑
j=1
log qψ(si|zi,j)
]
, (6)
where {zi,j}kj=1 iid∼ qφ(z|xi, si) are the same samples used for Li(θ, φ) as given by (4), and λ > 0
is a parameter that controls the emphasis on invariance. Note that when s is a categorical variable
(e.g., a class label), the additional, adversarial network to realize the variational posterior qψ(s|z)
is essentially just a classifier trained (by minimizing cross-entropy loss) to recover s from the
representation z generated by the encoder. In this approach, the VAE is adversarially trained to
maximize the cross-entropy loss of this classifier combined with the original objective given by (3).
Figure 1 illustrates the overall VAE training framework including adversarial censoring.
2.3 Invariance via KL-divergence Censoring
Another approach to enforce invariance is to introduce a hyperparameter γ > 1 to increase the weight
of the KL-divergence terms in (4), yielding the alternative objective terms
Lγi (θ, φ) := −γ KL
(
qφ(z|xi, si)
∥∥p(z))+ 1
k
k∑
j=1
log pθ(xi|si, zi,j), (7)
for which (4) is the special case when γ = 1. The KL-divergence terms KL
(
qφ(z|xi, si)
∥∥p(z))
can be interpreted as regularizing the variational posterior toward the latent prior, which encourages
the encoder to generate representations z that are invariant to not only s but also the data x. While
increasing γ further encourages invariant representations, it potentially disrupts model learning, since
the overall dependence on the data is affected.
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Figure 2: Quantitative performance comparison. Smaller values along the x-axes correspond to better
invariance. Larger values along the y-axis (ELBO) correspond to better model learning.
3 Experiments
We evaluate the performance of various VAEs for learning invariant representations, under several
scenarios for conditioning the encoder and/or decoder on the sensitive/nuisance variable s:
• Full: Both the encoder and decoder are conditioned on s. In this case, the decoder is
the generative model pθ(x|z, s) and the encoder is the variational posterior qφ(z|x, s) as
described in Section 2.1.
• Partial: Only the decoder is conditioned on s. This case is similar to the previous, except
that the encoder approximates the variational posterior qφ(z|x) without s as an input.
• Basic (unconditioned): Neither the encoder nor decoder are conditioned on s. This baseline
case is the standard, unconditioned VAE where s is not used as an input.
In combination with these VAE scenarios, we also examine several approaches for encouraging
invariant representations:
• Adversarial Censoring: This approach, as described in Section 2.2, introduces an addi-
tional network that attempts to recover s from the representation z. The VAE and this
additional network are adversarially trained according to the objective given by (6).
• KL Censoring: This approach, as described in Section 2.3, increases the weight on the
KL-divergence terms, using the alternative objective terms given by (7).
• Baseline (none): As a baseline, the VAE is trained according to the original objective given
by (3) without any additional modifications to enforce invariance.
3.1 Dataset and Network Details
We use the MNIST dataset, which consists of 70,000 grayscale, 28× 28 pixel images of handwritten
digits and corresponding labels in {0, . . . 9}. We treat the vectorized images in [0, 1]784 as the data x,
while the digit labels serve as the nuisance variable s. Thus, our objective is to train VAE models that
learn representations z that capture features (i.e., handwriting style) invariant of the digit class s.
We use basic, multilayer perceptron architectures to realize the VAE (similar to the architecture
used in [9]) and the adversarial network. This allows us to illustrate how the performance of
even very simple VAE architectures can be improved with adversarial censoring. We choose the
latent representation z to have 20 dimensions, with its prior set as the standard Gaussian, i.e.,
p(z) = N (0, I). The encoder, decoder, and adversarial networks each use a single hidden layer
of 500 nodes with the tanh activation function. In the scenarios where the encoder (or decoder)
is conditioned on the nuisance variable, the one-hot encoding of s is concatenated with x (or z,
respectively) to form the input. The adversarial network uses a 10-dimensional softmax output layer
to produce the variational posterior qψ(s|z).
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(a) Partial – Baseline (b) Partial – Adversarial censoring (c) Partial – KL censoring
(d) Full – Baseline (e) Full – Adversarial censoring (f) Full – KL censoring
Figure 3: Style transfer with conditional VAEs. The top row within each image shows the original test
set examples input the encoder, while the other rows show the corresponding output of the decoder
when conditioned on different digit classes {0, . . . , 9}.
We use the encoder to realize the conditionally Gaussian variational posterior given by (2). The en-
coder network produces a 40-dimensional vector (with no activation function applied) that represents
the mean vector µ concatenated with the log of the diagonal of the covariance matrix Σ. This allows
us to compute the KL-divergence terms in (4) analytically as given by [9].
The output layer of the decoder network has 784 nodes and applies the sigmoid activation function,
matching the size and scale of the images. We treat the decoder output, denoted by y = fθ(s, z), as
parameters of a generative model pθ(x|s, z) given by
log pθ(x|s, z) =
784∑
i=1
xi log yi + (1− xi) log(1− yi),
where xi and yi are the components of x and y, respectively. Although not strictly binary, the MNIST
images are nearly black and white, allowing this Bernoulli generative model to be a reasonable
approximation. We directly display y to generate the example output images.
We implemented these experiments with the Chainer deep learning framework [18]. The networks
were trained over the 60,000 image training set for 100 epochs with 100 images per batch, while
evaluation and example generation were performed with the 10,000 image test set. The adversarial
and VAE networks were each updated alternatingly once per batch with Adam [8]. Relying on
stochastic estimation over each batch, we set the sampling parameter k = 1 in (4), (6), and (7).
3.2 Evaluation Methods
We quantitatively evaluate the trained VAEs for how well they:
• Learn the data model: We measure this with the ELBO score estimated by computing
1
n
∑n
i=1 Li(θ, φ) over the test data set (see (3) and (4)).
• Produce invariant representations: We measure this via the adversarial approach de-
scribed in Section 2.2. Even when not using adversarial censoring, we still train an adversar-
ial network in parallel (i.e., its loss gradients are not fed back into the main VAE training)
6
(a) Partial – Baseline (b) Partial – Adversarial censoring (c) Partial – KL censoring
(d) Full – Baseline (e) Full – Adversarial censoring (f) Full – KL censoring
Figure 4: Generative sampling with conditional VAEs. Latent representations z are sampled from
p(z) = N (0, I) and input to the decoder to generate synthetic images, with the decoder conditioned
on selected digit classes in {0, . . . , 9}.
that attempts to recover the sensitive variable s from the representation z. The classification
accuracy and cross-entropy loss of the adversarial network provide measures of invariance.
Since the digit class s is uniformly distributed over {0, . . . , 9}, the entropy h(s) is equal
to log(10) and can be combined with the cross-entropy loss (see (5) and [1]) to yield an
estimate of the mutual information I(s; z), which we report instead.
The VAEs are also qualitatively evaluated with the following visual tasks:
• Style Transfer (Digit Change): An image x from the test set is input to the encoder to
produce a representation z by sampling from qφ(z|x, s). Then, the decoder is applied to
produce the image y = fθ(s′, z), while changing the digit class to s′ ∈ {0, . . . , 9}.
• Generative Model Sampling: A synthetic image is generated by first sampling a latent
variable z from the prior p(z) = N (0, I), and then applying the decoder to produce the
image y = fθ(s, z) for a selected digit class s ∈ {0, . . . , 9}.
3.3 Results and Discussion
Figure 2 presents the quantitative performance comparison for the various combinations of VAEs with
full ( ), partial (N), or no conditioning (), and with invariance encouraged by adversarial censoring
(red —), KL censoring (blue ---), or nothing (black). Each pair of red and blue curves represent
varying emphasis on enforcing invariance (as the parameters λ and γ are respectively changed) and
meet at a black point corresponding to the baseline (no censoring) case (where λ = 0 and γ = 1).
Unsurprisingly, the baseline, unconditioned VAE produces a representation z that readily reveals the
digit class s (97.1% accuracy), since otherwise image reconstruction by the decoder would be difficult.
However, even when partially or fully conditioned on s, the baseline VAEs still significantly reveal s
(partial: 84.1%, full: 75.1% accuracies). Both adversarial and KL censoring are effective at enforcing
invariance, with adversarial accuracy approaching chance and mutual information approaching zero
as the parameters λ and γ are respectively increased. However, the adversarial approach has less of
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(a) MNIST Examples (b) Basic – Adversarial censoring (c) Basic – Adversarial censoring
(d) Basic – Baseline (e) Basic – KL censoring (f) Basic – KL censoring
Figure 5: Generative sampling with unconditioned (“basic”) VAEs. Attempting to censor an uncondi-
tioned VAE results in severely degraded model performance.
an impact on the model learning performance (as measured by the ELBO score). With conditional
VAEs, adversarial censoring achieves invariance while having only a small impact on the ELBO
score, and appears to visually improve performance (particularly for the partially conditioned case)
in the style transfer and sampling tasks as shown in Figures 3 and 4. The worse model learning
performance with KL censoring seems to result in blurrier (although seemingly cleaner) images,
as also shown in Figures 3 and 4. Attempting to censor a basic (unconditioned) autoencoder (as
proposed by [4]) rapidly degrades model learning performance, which manifests as severely degraded
sampling performance as shown in Figure 5.
The results in Figures 3 and 4 correspond to specific points in Figure 2 as follows: (a) baseline N,
(b) left-most —N— (λ = 20), (c) left-most --N-- (γ = 8), (d) baseline  , (e) left-most — — (λ = 20),
(f) left-most -- -- (γ = 8). Figure 5 results correspond to points in Figure 2 as follows: (a) MNIST
test examples, (b-c) two left-most —— (λ = 100, 50), (d) baseline , (e-f) two left-most ----
(γ = 50, 20). Note that larger values for the λ and γ parameters were required for the unconditioned
VAEs to achieve similar levels of invariance as the conditioned cases.
4 Conclusion
The natural combination of conditional VAEs with adversarial censoring is a theoretically well-
founded method to generate invariant representations that are disentangled from nuisance variations.
Conditioning the decoder on the nuisance variable s allows the representation z to be cleanly separated
and model learning performance to be preserved, since s and z are both used to reconstruct the data
x. Training VAEs with adversarial censoring visually improved performance in style transfer and
generative sampling tasks.
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